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BANKRUPTCY - LABOR CONTRIBUTION BY JUNIOR INTEREST
SATISFIES FAIR AND EQUITABLE STANDARD FOR CRAM DOWN. In re
Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Ahlers financed the operation of their individually owned and
operated farm through loans from the Federal Land Bank (FLB) and
Norwest Bank of Worthington, Minnesota (Norwest). FLB held first
mortgages on various parcels of the farm land, and Norwest held sec-
ond mortgages on the land and first mortgages on the machinery,
equipment, crops, livestock, and other farm proceeds. The value of the
underlying collateral had decreased as a result of depressed market
conditions, and the loans were substantially undersecured.
Norwest sued in Minnesota state court to replevy the equipment
and machinery after the Ahlers missed several loan payments. The
Ahlers then filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,1 which automatically stayed the state court proceedings.
Norwest and FLB petitioned for relief from the stay in bankruptcy
court.2 In an evidentiary hearing on the creditors' motion, the bank-
ruptcy court found that the Ahlers would have to make monthly pay-
ments of interest on the current value of the collateral to provide the
banks with adequate protection.3 The court determined that the Ahlers
would not be able to make such payments, and accordingly lifted the
stay, allowing the creditors to proceed against the Ahlers. The Ahlers
then removed the replevin suit from state court to the bankruptcy
court, which granted a motion by Norwest allowing for seizure of the
property.4
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1985) provides in relevant part:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay...
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest ....
3. U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. 11 1985) provides in relevant part:
When adequate protection is required under section 362... of an interest of an entity
in property, such adequate protection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such entity, to the extent
that the stay under section 362 . . . results in a decrease in the value of such entity's
interest in such property . ...
4. The motion by Norwest for prejudgment seizure of the property securing the equipment
loan was essentially a request to lift the stay as applied to that particular piece of equipment. To
maintain the stay under I I U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1982) the debtor, Ahlers, had to show that
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The Ahlers appealed the orders removing the stay and allowing
seizure of the property to the district court. The district court affirmed
both orders and found that the Chapter 11 reorganization plan pro-
posed by the Ahlers had no reasonable prospect of success.5
The Ahlers then appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which reversed and remanded with directions. One of the issues ad-
dressed by the Eighth Circuit was whether it was possible as a matter
of law for the Ahlers to propose a "fair and equitable" plan in which
they retained any ownership interest in the farm, or whether such re-
tention of ownership would be a violation of the absolute priority rule.
The court analyzed the rule of absolute priority and found that it
would allow confirmation of a plan in which the Ahlers retained an
ownership interest. It determined that the Ahlers' commitment to oper-
ate the farm was a contribution of labor, skill, and experience that sat-
isfied the rule. The court held that a plan proposed by the Ahlers could
be confirmed as "fair and equitable," if on remand it was found that
the contribution of labor, skill, and experience was equivalent to the
value of the retained ownership interest. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1986).
Historically, the term "fair and equitable" was used to indicate
that a plan of reorganization met the necessary standards of fairness.
The term encompassed the judicially formulated rule of absolute prior-
the property was necessary to an effective reorganization. Some courts, including the bankruptcy
court in this case, also require the debtor to show that an effective reorganization is reasonably
feasible as a threshold issue. The bankruptcy court granted Norwest's motion for prejudgment
seizure based on the district court's determination that the Ahlers' plan was not feasible. In re
Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 399 (8th Cir. 1986).
5. The reported opinion does not contain the specifics of the Ahlers' plan. However, an ap-
pendix to the opinion contains a plan formulated by the Eighth Circuit for use as a guide to the
lower courts as they consider the case on remand. The plan divides each of the undersecured debts
into two claims, an allowed secured claim equal to the value of the underlying collateral and an
unsecured claim for the balance of the debt. See infra note 78. The Ahlers' other unsecured debts
are treated as unsecured claims as well. The plan then provides for holders of secured claims to
retain first liens on the collateral and to receive new promissory notes in the amount of the allowed
secured claim. The notes have adjusted interest rates and extended payment periods so that the
net yearly payments made by the Ahlers are reduced. The plan further provides for yearly pay-
ments to be made on the unsecured claims so that they will be fully paid within 10 years. In re
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 410.
6. The absolute priority rule requires that a plan fully satisfy claims senior in priority before
junior claims or interests receive any compensation. The rule is codified in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1985). See infra note 74. The retention of an ownership interest by
the Ahlers put them into a class of interests junior in priority to the claims of Norwest and FLB.
See infra note 49.
7. W. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 63.21, at 25 (1986).
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ity as one of the requisite standards to be satisfied.8 The rule required a
reorganization plan to fully compensate the most senior secured credi-
tors before junior creditors received any compensation.9 The United
States Supreme Court formulated the rule of absolute priority as part
of the statutory requirement that a reorganization plan be "fair and
equitable." 10
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry.,1' a railroad
reorganization case, the United States Supreme Court held that a
mortgagee could foreclose and exclude inferior lienholders, unsecured
creditors, and stockholders, but that if the foreclosure attempted to re-
serve any interest to the mortgagor-stockholders, the prior right of
creditors must be preserved."9 The Court applied this holding in North-
ern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd,." a subsequent railroad reorganization case,
and first announced the rule of absolute priority. 4 The Court held that
a creditor's right as against the stockholders' was absolute in its prior-
ity, so that the creditor's claim had to be fully satisfied before the
stockholders retained any interest in the property transferred to the
new company. 15 In dicta, the Court noted that cooperation between the
8. Id. at 24-25.
9. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative,
39 Bus. LAW. 441, 442 (1984).
10. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942) (held
"fair and equitable" to be applicable in Chapter X reorganizations); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (held "fair and equitable" applicable to § 77B reorganizations).
The most common plan of reorganization in such cases provided for the assets of the insolvent
debtor company to be acquired at the foreclosure sale by another company comprised of the se-
cured creditors and stockholders of the debtor. The secured creditors would bid the amount owed
by the debtor plus some nominal amount to provide cash to satisfy some of the unsecured creditors
and prevent nuisance suits. The stockholders of the debtor would cooperate in the foreclosure
proceeding allowing for a speedy transfer in return for stock issued by the acquiring company.
The results of such plans were threefold. The secured creditors traded their claims against the old
company for an ownership interest in the new company. The stockholders of the old company
traded their worthless stock in the insolvent company for stock in the new company. And, the
unsecured creditors were paid a nominal portion of their debt or were cut off entirely with no way
to collect their claims. The courts found such results to be in direct conflict with the equitable
principle that the stockholders' interest in the property of a corporation is subordinate to the rights
of creditors. Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41
U. CHI. L. REv. 651 (1974). See also Anderson & Wright, Liquidating Plans of Reorganizations,
56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29 (1982).
11. 174 U.S. 674 (1899).
12. Id. at 677.
13. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
14. Id. at 504-05. Unlike the plan in Louisville Trust, which cut off all of the unsecured
creditors and some of the secured creditors, the plan in Boyd provided for some, but not all, of the
claims of the unsecured creditors to be paid. Id. at 488.
15. Id. at 504.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
stockholders and secured creditors may be the only way to effectuate
the reorganization when the corporate property is of such enormous
value that its purchase by others is not feasible.1 The Court would not
allow such joint efforts, however, to operate to deprive the unsecured
creditors of their rights, while leaving the stockholders an interest in
the property.' 7 Subsequent cases indicated that the holding in Boyd
was a "fixed principle" to be rigidly adhered to in evaluating a reorgan-
ization plan.18
However, the dicta in Boyd about cooperation between the owners
and creditors caused inconsistent application of the rule among the cir-
cuit courts of appeal. The decisions varied because it was not clear
under what conditions an ownership interest could be retained.' 9 The
Supreme Court discussed the conditions under which an ownership in-
terest could be retained in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,"
and essentially created an exception to the absolute priority rule." The
exception allows for an ownership interest to be retained when the
debtor makes a substantial fresh contribution in money or money's
worth necessary to effectuate the reorganization plan.2
In Case the Court considered a corporate debtor's plan to adjust
the outstanding debt by reducing creditors' claims to the value of the
assets and then satisfying the adjusted claims with shares of preferred
stock in the reorganized corporation. 3 Under the plan, the stockholders
in the old corporation, who by operation of the absolute priority rule
would have no rights to the assets of the old corporation, were to re-
ceive stock in the new corporation equal to twenty-three percent of the
16. Id.
17. Id. at 505.
18. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454 (1926).
19. See In re Georgian Hotel Corp., 82 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1936) (plan held valid where
mortgage bondholders received income bonds and old stockholders received common stock in the
new company; viewed as a change in form but not substance); Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., 98
F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1938) (plan disapproved where bondhonders to received preferred stock and
stockholders to receive common stock and retain control; viewed as a scheme by inept manage-
ment to retain control). Some courts circumvented the results of the rule by their treatment of the
valuation of the debtor company. Note, Absolute Priority Rule Under Chapter X - A Rule of
Law or a Familiar Quotation?, 52 COLum L. REV. 900 (1952). But see In re Barclay Park Corp.,
90 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1937) (plan disapproved because bondholders were to receive preferred stock
and stockholders to receive common stock; viewed as preferring the stockholders at the expense of
the creditors).
20. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
21. Id. at 121.
22. Id. at 121-22. The Court used the term "money or in money's worth" without defining it.
The argument for a labor contribution is based on the implicit flexibility of the term "money's
worth."
23. Id. at 111.
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assets of the new corporation. 4 The Supreme Court held that, as a
matter of law, the plan was not "fair and equitable."2 5 The debtor had
argued that the issuance of stock to the old stockholders was necessary
to insure their continued participation as managers of the reorganized
corporation.2 6 Rejecting this argument, the Court went on to explain
some of the conditions under which the stockholders could partici-
pate.217 The Court summarized the exception to the absolute priority
rules as follows: When the debtor is insolvent and the stockholders
make a fresh contribution in "money or in money's worth," they can
participate in the reorganized corporation to an extent reasonably
equivalent to their contribution.2 8 The Court then found on the facts of
the case that financial standing and influence in the community and
continuity of management could not possibly be translated into money's
worth reasonably equivalent to the participation accorded the old
stockholders.29
Congress used the term "fair and equitable" as the standard for
confirmation of a reorganization plan in the 1934 Act,30 which added
section 77B to the Bankruptcy Act of 1933.81 Since the term had "ac-
quired a fixed meaning through judicial interpretations in the field of
equity receivership reorganizations,"3 2 the Supreme Court in Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. ss viewed its use by the legislature as
an indication of legislative intent to insert that fixed meaning into sec-
tion 77B." Congress again used the term "fair and equitable" in the
Chandler Act,35 which repealed section 77B and substituted Chapters
X, XI, and XII as the three primary means for rehabilitating business
enterprises."' The Supreme Court again held that the term incorpo-
24. Id. at 112.
25. Id. at 114.
26. Id. at 112.
27. Id. at 117.
28. Id. at 122.
29. Id.
30. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911. Section 77B was adopted to allow for the
rehabilitation of industrial corporations. J. ANDERSON, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS, § 12.26,
at 12-105 (1983).
31. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1474.
32. 308 U.S. at 115.
33. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
34. Id.
35. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840. "[Section] 221(2) provided that the court
could only confirm a plan if it was satisfied that 'the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible.'" J.
ANDERSON, supra note 30, § 12.26, at 12-107 (emphasis added).
36. Chapter X was intended to cover corporate reorganization, Chapter Xl noncorporate bus-
iness reorganization, though not expressly closed to corporations, and Chapter XII the individual
1986-871
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rated prior law, and extended the absolute priority rule to Chapter X
reorganizations.
3 7
Under the new Bankruptcy Code, which was fully revised by Con-
gress in 1979,8g the term "fair and equitable" is used as the standard
for cram down 3 - confirmation of a reorganization plan when a class
of impaired claims4 0 does not accept the plan.4 1 The new code codifies
the absolute priority rule and its applicability when a plan is crammed
down. 42 However, the code is silent as to the conditions under which an
ownership interest may be retained when cram down is invoked. 43 The
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether the new code incorporates
either the existing case law of the absolute priority rule or the Case
exception for fresh contribution. Lower courts have consistently relied
on existing case law as authority when applying the absolute priority
rule under the new code.44 However, the lower courts are inconsistent
bankrupt. Congress later deleted the fair and equitable standard from Chapter XI and Chapter
XII because it was thought to frustrate the purpose of the Act. J. ANDERSON, supra note 30, §
12.26, at 12-107 to -111.
37. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 (1942).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985). In 1970 Congress established a bankruptcy
commission for the purpose of drafting a new bankruptcy act. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission filed reports with Congress on July 31, 1973 (Part I) and
on August 6, 1973 (Part II). The new bankruptcy act was adopted in 1979.
39. "Cram down" is the colloquial term for confirmation of a plan over the dissent of an
umpaired class. "In many instances, the terms confirmation and cram down are used synony-
mously; however, this is not accurate since one of the objectives of the Code is to facilitate confir-
mations through negotiations and bargaining without the use of cram down provisions." J. ANDER-
SON, supra note 30, § 12.24, at 12-88. Eleven conditions must be met for a plan to be confirmed
by the court. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Paragraph 8 of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)
(1982) requires that each class either accept the plan or not be impaired under the plan. See infra
note 40. However, if paragraph 8 is the only one of the eleven conditions not satisfied then the
plan may be confirmed under the cram down provision, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. III 1985). See
infra notes 41 and 75.
40. A class of claims is impaired when any of its legal, equitable, or contractual rights are
altered under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. III 1985).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982) provides in relevant part:
(b)(1) . . . if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section other
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the propo-
nent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such para-
graph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect
to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan. (Emphasis added).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). See infra note 74.
43. In re Marston Enters. Inc., 13 Bankr. 514, 517 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
44. "There is ... nothing in the Code which precludes the case law which developed under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act . . . from application to Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code."
Id. at 518. See also In re U.S. Truck Co., 47 Bankr. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1985), affid, 800 F.2d 581
(6th Cir. 1986), cited in In re Pecht, 57 Bankr. 137, 140 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Butler, 42
Bankr. 777, 785 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984); In re Genesee Cement, Inc., 31 Bankr. 442, 444 n.1
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in their application of the Case rule when considering retained owner-
ship interests."
A New York bankruptcy court anlayzed the conditions under
which the new code would allow cram down of a plan providing for
retained ownership in In re Marston Enterprises, Inc.4 The suit in-
volved a corporate debtor whose plan called for the old common stock
to be cancelled and stock in the reorganized debtor to be purchased by
the old common stockholders.4 7 Relying on Case, the court held that
the plan did not violate the "fair and equitable" standard because the
stockholders were not retaining their ownership interest, but were
purchasing their interest in the reorganized corporation."
A Missouri bankruptcy court took the analysis a step further in In
re Landau Boat Co.4 Adopting the Case exception to the absolute pri-
ority rule, the court focused on defining the "substantial" element of
the exception and developed criteria to determine when a proposed con-
tribution is substantial enough to make a plan "fair and equitable." 50 It
held the contribution to be substantial when it exceeded the value of
the interest retained. 51 The court also ruled that the retained interest
should be valued on the basis of expected income and then discounted
by a business risk factor.52 The court concluded that because of the
business risks involved, the present investment of new value through a
stock purchase by the old stockholders exceeded the retained value, and
confirmed the plan.53
(Bankr. E.D. Mich, 1983); In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 833 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981), cited in In re
East, 57 Bankr. 14, 16 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
45. For cases adopting the rule of contribution and holding a plan valid see In re U.S. Truck
Co., 47 Bankr. 932, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (stock purchase); In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr.
788, 793 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (stock purchase); In re Marston Enters. Inc., 13 Bankr. 514,
518 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (capital contribution). But see cases adopting the rule but holding
the plan invalid due to the nature of the contribution, In re Pecht, 57 Bankr. 137, 141 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1986) (earnings of sole proprietor); In re East, 57 Bankr. 14, 19 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985)
(zero value of retained interest). See also cases not considering the rule, In re Butler, 42 Bankr.
777 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984); In re Genesee Cement, Inc., 31 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1983); In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
46. 13 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
47. Id. at 515-16. The Historical and Revision notes following 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1982) pro-
vide that "'interest' includes the interest of. . .a proprietor in a sole proprietorship, or the inter-
est of a common or preferred stockholder in a corporation."
48. 13 Bankr. at 518.
49. 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
50. Id. at 792.
51. Id. at 793.
52. Id. at 792-93.
53. Id. at 793 (citing Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941)). See
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Unlike the courts in Landau Boat and Marston Enterprises, which
impliedly held the Case exception to have been incorporated into the
absolute priority rule as codified, the bankruptcy court in In re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co.6" reached an opposite result on similar
facts. It applied the absolute priority rule as codified, without consider-
ing the Case exception, and held a retained ownership plan unconfirm-
able.55 The court did not expressly reject the contribution exception;
rather, it failed to consider whether the proposed contribution of
$700,000 in cash by the partners of the limited partnership was suffi-
cient to render the proposed plan in which they retained an ownership
interest "fair and equitable.""
The Marston Enterprises/Landau Boat analysis of the Case excep-
tion as a mechanism to allow stockholders to buy back into the reorga-
nized debtor is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Case
and with the relevant dicta as well.51 However, courts have been hesi-
tant to extend the application of the contribution exception to a
noncorporate individual or partnership."
In In re East" the insolvent individual debtor attempted to "cram
down" a plan in which he would retain an ownership interest. He ar-
gued that since he could not divest himself of ownership in the way
that a corporation could by cancelling and then reissuing stock, he suf-
fered a discriminatory effect based on the substantive difference be-
tween an individually held business and a corporation.60 The court re-
also In re U.S. Truck Co., 47 Bankr. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) which reached similar results
based on the business risks assumed by the stockholders in investing.
54. 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
55. Id. at 834.
56. Id. at 823, 831, 834. The court raised the issue sua sponte and may have decided it
without benefit of brief or oral argument. See also In re Butler, 42 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1984) (the court held that fair and equitable was applicable as the standard for evaluating the
treatment under a reorganization plan of an individual creditor. However, by the terms of the
statute "fair and equitable" is applied only to evaluate the treatment of a class of claims, not of an
individual creditor; and it is applied only when cram down is invoked. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). The
statute assures the individual creditor in a reorganization plan only the treatment he would have
received if the debtor had liquidated rather than reorganized. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(7).) and In re
Stoffel, 41 Bankr. 390, 392-93 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (court used the plain meaning of the
words fair and equitable in rejecting a plan as "simply not fair" and "simply not realistic treat-
ment of the debt").
57. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939).
58. See cases cited supra note 45.
59. 57 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
60. Id. at 15, 18. In more detail the debtor's argument was that: 1) Individuals cannot give
up their retained ownership interest in the manner that a corporation can by cancelling and reissu-
ing stock; 2) since individuals are unable to do this they are denied cram down in every instance
that they cannot pay the unsecured creditors in full for their claims. This is anomalous because if
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jected his argument and held that as a matter of law mere insolvency
was insufficient to permit "cram down" where the debtor is an individ-
ual.6 The court explained the options available to the individual debtor
as paying all his debts and keeping all his property, giving up his prop-
erty and being released from his debts, or reaching a compromise to
which his creditors agreed. "[W]hat he cannot do is keep all of his
property while paying only part of his debt."62
In another noncorporate case, In re Pecht,Oa the debtor argued that
since the earnings he derived as an individual from the business opera-
tion were not part of his bankruptcy estate," he would make fresh con-
tribution by pledging to apply them to the unsecured debt.65 The court
refused to accept this argument, inventing the requirement that new
value must be contributed up front as a condition precedent to confir-
mation of the plan. 6 The court saw this as necessary to be consistent
with the "spirit" of the "cram down" provision. 67 Also, the court rea-
soned that to accept the contribution of an individual's earnings as new
value would permit the individual a "much better treatment than a cor-
porate debtor could obtain."'
In In re Ahlers 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
the unsecured creditors were paid in full they would not be impaired and cram down would not be
needed; 3) it was not the intent of Congress that individuals be denied cram down; and 4) to deny
individuals cram down places them under a heavier burden than corporations and is
discriminatory.
61. Id. at 19. In a well researched and reasoned opinion, the court addressed each part of the
debtor's argument. It concluded that: 1) there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that
Congress expressly intended to make "cram down" available to individuals; 2) there is nothing to
indicate that Congress intended for individuals to have a lighter burden than corporations; and 3)
"cram down" is not completely denied to individuals because they can purchase their retained
interests. The court cited In re Marston Enters., 13 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), as au-
thority for this last point. Id. at 18-19.
62. 57 Bankr. at 19. Another argument presented to the court was that when a debtor is
insolvent, the value of the retained ownership interest is zero, and therefore it is not unfair or
inequitable for the debtor to retain it. The court rejected the argument as "semantics without
substance." Id. at 17. Another bankruptcy court in In re Genese Cement, Inc., 31 Bankr. 442
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983), rejected this argument for reasons of equity and public policy.
63. 57 Bankr. 137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (Supp. I1 1985). A similar earnings argument was presented in In
re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984) (The court held the exemption to extend only to
those earnings personally generated by the debtor, so that earnings attributable to invested capital,
accounts receivable, good will, etc. accrued to the estate.), cited in In re Brusseau, 57 Bankr. 457
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
65. In re Pecht, 57 Bankr. at 139.
66. Id. at 140.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 141.
69. 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
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farmer's contribution of labor, expertise, and skill satisfied the fresh
contribution exception to the absolute priority rule.70 The Eighth Cir-
cuit, the highest court to have addressed the issue, held that as a mat-
ter of law the plan would be "fair and equitable" if on remand the
bankruptcy court found the value of the labor contribution to exceed
the value of the retained ownership interest.7 The court relied on the
case law of the "fair and equitable" standard under previous bank-
ruptcy statutes and impliedly held the Case exception of contribution to
have been incorporated into the absolute priority rule as codified."2
Judge Heaney, writing for the court, noted the conditions neces-
sary to confirm a plan over the dissent of an impaired class of claims.73
The court determined that under the "cram down" provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code7 4 the court shall confirm a plan over the objection of
70. Id. at 392.
71. Id. at 403.
72. Id. at 402.
73. Id. at 399-400. The "cram down" provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) sets forth three separate sets of requirements, one of which
must be met for a plan to be considered "fair and equitable." See infra note 74. The particular set
of requirements the court will apply depends upon the type of claim held by the dissenting class.
The "rule of absolute priority" has been codified and made applicable when the objecting class
holds unsecured claims or is a class of interests. See infra note 74, §§ I129(b)(2)(B) &
1129(b)(2)(C). This differs significantly from the applicability of the rule under prior bankruptcy
statutes. Formerly, the "fair and equitable" standard was the ultimate test applied by the court
when i dividual creditors objected to the confirmation of a plan. Under the new bankruptcy act
"fair and equitable" is applied only for "cram down" over a dissenting class of claims and only to
the treatment of classes junior in priority to the dissenting class. "Therefore, . . . senior accepting
classes are permitted to give up value to junior classes as long as no dissenting intervening class
received less than the amount of its claims in full." J. ANDERSON, supra note 30 at § 12-98. Also,
it is the treatment of the class of claims and not of the individual creditors to which the absolute
priority rule applies.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at
least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in
such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of
such lien, with such lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and
the treatment of such lien on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of
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an impaired class when 1) requested by the proponent of the plan, 2)
the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and 3) the plan is "fair and
equitable" with respect to each class of creditors that has not accepted
the plan.7 5
The court then concentrated on the conditions that would render
the Ahlers' plan "fair and equitable." The court noted that under the
"cram down" provisions the applicable standard defining "fair and eq-
uitable" depends on the type of claim held by the dissenting class. 76
Under the proposed plan Norwest and FLB, as secured creditors with
undersecured claims, would be placed into two classes of claims." They
held secured allowed claims 78 measured by the value of the collateral at
the effective date of the plan and unsecured claims for the difference
between value of the collateral and amount of the debt.79 Therefore,
the Ahlers' plan had to meet two standards of "fair and equitable" to
be crammed down.80
Considering the class of secured claims, the court found that the
this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of
such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property.
(C) With respect to a class of interests-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive or
retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any
fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed
redemption price to which such holder is entitled, or the value of such
interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will
not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest
any property. (Emphasis added.)
75. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 400-01.
76. See supra notes 73 and 74.
77. See supra note 5.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) provides in part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim
to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
79. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399.
80. Id. at 400-01.
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plan could be crammed down if 1) the plan proposed that the secured
creditors retain a lien in the collateral securing their allowed secured
claims, and 2) that they receive deferred cash payments having a pre-
sent value equal to the value of the collateral securing their claims. 81
With regard to the class of unsecured claims, the court found that
the plan could be crammed down if it satisfied one of two alternate
tests set out in the statute.82 The first test required that the plan pro-
vide for the class of unsecured claims to receive property of a value
equal to the amount of their claim.83 The court agreed with the credi-
tors' contention that the Ahlers could not propose any realistic reorgan-
ization plan that would satisfy such a test.84 The court did not agree
with the creditors' argument that such inability also prevented the
Ahlers from meeting the second test.8 5 The alternate test allowed
"cram down" of a plan that provided for any treatment of the class of
unsecured claims so long as no junior class retained an interest in the
debtor's property8" "on account of such jurior claim or interest
.... ,8. The creditors argued that the Ahlers' plan did not satisfy the
second test because they would retain their ownership interest, which
was junior to the unsecured claims, without providing for the unsecured
creditors in full.81 The court did not agree with this argument, finding
that the statutory test applied a modified version of the absolute prior-
ity rule, which incorporated the Case exception 9 rather than the tradi-
tional formulation advanced by the creditors.
The court reviewed the United States Supreme Court holdings in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 0 and Kansas City Terminal
Railway Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.9" and interpreted them as es-
tablishing an exception to the absolute priority rule. The exception al-
lowed a junior ownership interest to participate in the reorganization
plan when it makes a fresh contribution equal to the value of its re-
tained interest.9 2 This contribution exception would allow the participa-
tion even though dissenting senior creditors might receive less than
81. Id. at 400.
82. Id. at 400-01.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 401.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)(1982).
88. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401.
89. Id. at 401-02.
90. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
91. 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
92. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401-02.
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their allowed claims.9" Concluding that a contribution satisfies the ab-
solute priority rule as codified when it is "something that is reasonably
compensatory and is measurable,' 94 the Eighth Circuit found persua-
sive a statement in Case" that when funds are "'essential to the suc-
cess of the undertaking,'" and "'the old stockholders make a fresh
contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent
to their contribution, no objection can be made.' "96 The court also con-
sidered the Supreme Court's purpose behind its statement in Case that
"'the stockholder's participation must be based on a contribution in
money or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent, in view of all the
circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.' ,97
Having framed the above rule, the court next considered whether
the Ahlers' proposed contribution of labor, skill, and expertise in con-
tinuing to operate the farm was "reasonably compensatory and .. .
measurable."' 8 In deciding that the labor contribution was measurable
in "money or in money's worth," the court reasoned that since the farm
operation and management skills were of value, but would not be re-
covered by the creditors if the farm were liquidated, allowing the
Ahlers to claim them as contribution was not unfair to the creditors. 99
The court found that the question of whether the proposed labor
contribution was reasonably compensatory required further analysis.100
Since the issue was whether the new contribution was reasonably
equivalent to the retained ownership interest, the problem was one of
valuation. The court did not formulate a mathemaical test to be ap-
plied; rather, it adopted the rule of In re Landau Boat Co. ° ' that the
value of the retained interest should be based on the expectation of
income or future earning capacity of the reorganized debtor, discounted
by a business risk factor.102
The court applied this rule to the facts in Ahlers and concluded
that "the Ahlers would not realize any real profit or benefit from their
retained equitable ownership interest until the reorganization plan was
93. Id. at 401.
94. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
95. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
96. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 401 (quoting Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308
U.S. 106, 121 (1939)) (emphasis added).
97. 794 F.2d at 401 (quoting Case, 308 U.S. at 122) (emphasis added).
98. 794 F.2d at 402.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
102. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402-03.
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completed and the secured creditors had been paid the full amount of
their allowed secured claims." 108 The court held that the Ahlers' contri-
bution of labor, skill, and expertise would satisfy the exception to the
rule of absolute priority, if the value of this contribution equaled or
exceeded the value of the retained ownership interest.10" The court re-
manded the case to the bankruptcy court for a determination of
whether the proposed labor contribution was reasonably
compensatory.10 5
Judge Gibson, dissenting,10 argued that the exception was more
narrowly drawn than the majority represented; that is, it was limited to
the contribution of fresh capital essential to the success of the plan.10 7
He reasoned that the majority's reliance on the dictum "money or in
money's worth" was unsound because the analogy between contribu-
tions of labor and capital was illogical. Gibson noted that labor is not a
liquid asset and that the value of labor is not fixed, but subject to spec-
ulation that injects uncertainty into the valuation process. The dissent-
ing judge also argued that a contribution of capital is made before plan
approval, and that a contribution of labor would be unenforceable and
therefore not of sufficient certainty to be found feasible. Finally, Judge
Gibson concluded that the majority had gone beyond its proper role as
a court of review by making a policy decision and formulating law to
implement it.' 0s
The dissent in Ahlers charges and the majority concedes that its
decsision is one based on policy.' " The majority realizes that to hold
labor contribution ineffective as an offset to the absolute priority rule
would deny the individual farmer an opportunity to reorganize.1 0
However, in making this policy decision the court has not necessarily
moved beyond its duty to interpret the law.
The Ahlers decision is clearly one of policy. The Eighth Circuit
has taken the lead in deciding an issue on which the applicable statute
and its legislative history are silent. By its holding in Ahlers, the
Eighth Circuit has incorporated the Case rule of contribution into the
statutory "cram down" provision. It has also defined contribution as
including a commitment to operate and labor upon a farm. Since the
103. Id. at 403.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 404 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 406.
108. Id. at 408.
109. Id.
110. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402.
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determination that a debtor's contribution of labor renders a plan "fair
and equitable" may turn on the specific facts of a case, it is appropriate
that the definition of contribution be judicially determined rather than
legislatively codified."' 1
The points raised by the dissent merit consideration by the court in
its duty to apply the law, but there is no precedent that would render
them dispositive. The valuation process is not one of rigorous mathe-
matical precision. 112 Further, a going concern has many intangible,
nonliquid assets that bear directly upon the success or failure of the
concern, including good will and the skill and expertise of its personnel.
The dissent's point that a commitment of labor could not be en-
forced is a statement that goes to the issue of servitude and policy con-
cerning enforcement of labor contracts. Because of these issues the
point deserves full judicial consideration. However, the court has within
its power the means to compel a person to do what he says he will do.
The dissent's concern that a contribution of labor is made after
plan approval is similar to the concern of the court in In re Pecht.11 3
The court in Pecht based its conclusion on the "spirit" of the "cram
down" provision.1 4 However, the Bankruptcy Act has embraced the
concept of "present value" as the basis for adjusting the terms and
conditions of debt payment. 115 Debt payment over time cannot be in-
11. Secured creditors with undersecured claims are the parties most prejudiced by the
Ahlers holding. The adverse impact can be reduced in some circumstances by making an election
under 1111 (b) and maintaining a claim for the full amount of their secured debt. In a "cram
down" situation the dissenting creditor who so elects will receive a lien on the collateral to the full
amount of the secured debt, whereas the nonelecting creditor will receive a lien only to the
amount of the allowed claim, which has been reduced to the value of the underlying collateral.
The election is particularly attractive when the value of the underlying collateral is depressed but
expected to recover. 11 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1982) provides:
(b)(l)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or disal-
lowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had re-
course against the debtor on account of such claim . . unless -
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects . . . application of paragraph (2) of
this subsection ....
(2) If such an election is made, then . . . such claim is a secured claim to the extent
that such claim is allowed.
See Historical and Revision Notes following II US.C. § 1129 (1982) at 145-46 for a discussion of
the operation of 111 (b).
112. See Note, supra note 19, at 904.
113. 57 Bankr. 137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
114. Id. at 140.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i)(1982) provides in relevant part: "deferred cash payments
of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim .... "
11 U.S.C. § 11 29(a)(9)(C)(Supp. 11 1985) provides in relevant part: "deferred cash payments
. . . of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim."
(Emphasis added.) See J. TRosT, G. TREISTER, L. FORMAN. K. KLEE & R. LEVIN. RESOURCE
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consistent with this concept, which is used throughout the statute.
The holding of Ahlers may be applicable to all noncorporate busi-
ness reorganizations. However, a court may, if it chooses, limit the
holding to the case of an individually owned and operated farm. Such
limitation may be justified because of the strong policy considerations
that influenced the decision.
Kimberly Golden
MATERIALS: THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE, ALI/ABA Committee on Continuing Professional
Education, 321-34 (1979) and Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the
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